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BOND V. UNITED STATES:

CAN THE PRESIDENT INCREASE
CONGRESS'S LEGISLATIVE POWER BY
ENTERING INTO A TREATY?*
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz••
On November 5, 2013, the Supreme Court heard oral argument
in Bond v. United States, 1 and as we go to press, the case is still pending before the Court. This is a terrific case, first because it has such
lurid facts. Mrs. Bond discovered that her husband had impregnated her best friend,2 so she did what anyone would do. She acquired
some chemicals and spread them on the friend's doorknob, car
door, and mailbox.3

' This is an introduction to an amici curiae brief supporting the petitioner in Bond
v. United States, filed on behalf of the Cato Institute, Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, and Atlantic Legal Foundation. The brief is reprinted infra at 233.
" Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center and a Senior Fellow
in Constitutional Studies at the Cato Institute.
1 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Bond v. United States, No. 12-158 (U.S. argued Nov. 5, 2013).
2 Brief for Respondent at 4, Bond v. United States, No. 12-158 (U.S. argued Nov. 5,
2013).
3 Id. at 4-5.
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This conduct is, of course, all sorts of state crime. 4 But Mrs.
Bond was not prosecuted for these state crimes. Instead, she was
prosecuted by an ambitious Assistant United States Attorney, for
violating the federal Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act.5
Now to be fair, this statute is written extremely broadly; 6 on its
face, it would appear to reach all sorts of purely local conduct like
Mrs. Bond's - conduct that hardly seems to be of national, let alone
international, concern. 7 And so the question in the case is: did Congress have the power to enact such a broad statute?B
The government's primary argument9 is that Congress does
have such power, because this statute was enacted to implement a
treaty. 10 The government argues, in other words, that-even assuming Congress would lack the power to enact this statute ordinarily- it has the power in this case, because the United States has entered into a treaty concerning chemical weapons. 11 That is the big
issue in the case: can a treaty increase the legislative power of Congress?
Now the great Paul Clement, arguing on behalf of Mrs. Bond,
offered the Court several ways to rule in favor of his client without
reaching this big issue. 12 In particular, he suggested that the Court

4

Brief for Petitioner at 20-23, Bond v. United States, No. 12-158 (U.S. argued Nov.

5, 2013).

s See id. at 7.
6 See generally Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-856 (2000) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 229 et. seq.).
7 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 46-50.
s Id. at i-ii; Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, § I.
9 The Government expressly waived any reliance on the Commerce Clause earlier
in the litigation, see Joint Appendix at 31, Bond v. United States, No. 12-158 (U.S.
argued Nov. 5, 2013) ("Section 229 was not enacted under the interstate commerce
authority."), but it nevertheless attempts to resuscitate the Commerce Clause argument at the Supreme Court. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 17-26.
10 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 26-27.
n See id.
12 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 12, 18-24.
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might construe the statute narrowly; hold that it actually does not
reach Mrs. Bond's conduct; and thus avoid the difficult constitutional question of whether a treaty can increase the power of Congress.13 Clement was savvy to offer the Court this option: Justice
Breyer, at least, seemed tempted by it at oral argument, 14 and it
might well win the day.
But we as amid, took a different approach. 15 From our perspective, this is a perfect case in which to answer the big question. And
it is well worth answering, because an erroneous chestnut of a
caseI6 and an erroneous foreign affairs treatise 17 have left the erroneous impression, for almost a century, that a treaty can, in fact,
increase the legislative power of Congress. In our view, that conclusion is in deep tension with the basic constitutional axiom of limited
federal power.
At first glance, this issue might seem an odd fit for this Journal.
This case is about a deep principle of constitutional structure, and

See id. at 12, 18-22, 24; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 42-57.
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 35 Oustice Breyer said to General Verrilli: "There's an easy way out of [deciding the constitutional question]. All
we do is say the chemicals involved are the chemicals in the annex."); id. at 48-49
Oustice Breyer also said to General Verrilli: "in principle your position constitutionally would allow the President and the Senate, not the House, to do anything
through a treaty that is not specifically within the prohibitions of the rights protections of the Constitution.... Isn't there an easier way to deal with this case?").
1s See generally Brief for Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Bond v. United States, No. 12-158 (U.S. argued Nov. 5, 2013).
16 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432-34 (1920) ("If the treaty is valid there
can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article 1, Section 8, as a
necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government.").
17 See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 481
n.111 (2nd ed. 1996) ("The 'necessary and proper' clause originally contained expressly the power 'to enforce treaties' but it was stricken as superfluous."); LoUIS
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 408 n.105 (1st ed. 1972) (same).
But see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REv.
1867, 1875, 1912-18 (2005) ("The words 'enforce treaties' never appeared in the Necessary and Proper Oause.").
13
14

2013]

BOND V. UNITED STATES

231

thus, one might think, only tangentially related to individual liberty. But nothing could be further from the truth. Matters of constitutional structure are inextricably bound up with matters of individual liberty. The deep structural themes of the Constitution federalism and separation of powers-are ultimately the Constitution's most powerful safeguards of liberty. Indeed, the Court saw
this point clearly, in the prior iteration of this very case, in a passage
that could be an apt epigraph for this new journal. The Court wrote:
Federalism secures the freedom of the individual. ... By
denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all
the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of
the individual from arbitrary power. When government
acts in excess of its lawful powers, that liberty is at stake. 18
For this reason, this structural issue is actually a perfect fit for
the New York University Journal of Law and Liberty. If a treaty could
increase the legislative power of Congress, then the constitutional
axiom of limited federal power would be a sham. 19 Our constitutional structure - and the liberty that it exists to preserve -would
be subject to change at the whim of the President, the Senate, and
Zimbabwe. 20
Unfortunately, the Court may not reach the big question in
Bond. But we reach it here, in our amicus brief, in which we argue
only the simple and crucial point: a treaty cannot increase the legisla-

1s Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011).
19 Brief for Cato Institute, supra note 15, at 6-7.
20 Id. at 21-22. See also Transcript of Oral Argument, at 32-33, Golan v. Holder, 132
S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545) Gustice Scalia said "I don't think that powers that Congress does not have under the Constitution can be acquired by simply obtaining the
agreement of the Senate, the President and Zimbabwe. I do not think a treaty can
expand the powers of the Federal Government.").
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tive power of Congress. 21 The brief is essentially a distillation of an
article that I wrote in 2005,22 and we are grateful to the Harvard
Law Review for permission to, in effect, reprint substantial sections
of that article. We are grateful, too, to the Journal of Law and Liberty
for choosing to showcase this brief.

21.
22

See generally Brief for Cato Institute, supra note 15, at 21-22.
See generally Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV.

L. REv. 1867 (2005).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The court below held that the Chemical Weapons Convention
increased the power of Congress, empowering it to enact 18 U.S.C. §
229. It held, in other words, that Congress is not limited to those
powers enumerated in the Constitution; rather, those powers may
be increased by treaty. The Third Circuit believed that it was bound
to reach this conclusion by a single, conclusory sentence in Missouri
v. Holland: "If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the
validity of the [implementing] statute under Article I, Section 8, as a
necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government.1 But the Third Circuit was obviously uneasy with this conclusion: "with practically no qualifying language in Holland to turn to,
we are bound to take at face value" that single sentence.2 "[I]t may
be that there is more to say about the uncompromising language
used in Holland than we are able to say, but that very direct language demands from us a direct acknowledgement of its meaning,
even if the result may be viewed as simplistic. If there is nuance that
has escaped us, it is for the Supreme Court to elucidate."3
Judge Ambro was even more explicit in concurrence:
I write separately to urge the Supreme Court to provide a
clarifying explanation of its statement in ... Holland . ... I
hope that the Supreme Court will soon flesh out "[t]he most
important sentence in the most important case about the
constitutional law of foreign affairs," and, doing so, clarify
(indeed curtail) the contours of federal power to enact laws

Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
Bond v. United States, 681 F.3d 149, 162 (3d Cir 2012).
3 Id. at 164-65 (footnote omitted).

1

2
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that intrude on matters so local that no drafter of the Convention contemplated their inclusion in it. 4
That one conclusory sentence from Holland implies that if a treaty commits the United States to enact some legislation, then Congress automatically obtains the power to enact that legislation, even
if it would otherwise lack such power. It implies, in other words,
that Congress's powers are not constitutionally fixed, but rather
may be expanded by treaty.
In Holland, Justice Holmes provided neither reasoning nor citation for this proposition. It appears in that one conclusory sentence,
in a five-page opinion that is primarily devoted to a different question. And this Court has never elaborated. The most influential argument supporting this proposition appears not in the United States
Reports but in the leading foreign affairs treatise. This argument has
largely short-circuited jurisprudential debate on the question. But
recent scholarship has shown that the historical premise of this academic argument is simply, demonstrably false.
The proposition that treaties can increase the power of Congress is inconsistent with the text of the Treaty Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Tenth Amendment. It is inconsistent with the fundamental structural principle that "[t]he powers
of the legislature are defined, and limited."S It implies, insidiously,
that that the President and the Senate can increase their own power
by treaty. And it implies, bizarrely, that the President alone-or a
foreign government alone - can decrease Congress's power and
render federal statutes unconstitutional. Finally, it creates a doubly
perverse incentive: an incentive to enter into foreign entanglements
simply to increase domestic legislative power.

4 Id. at 170 (Ambro, J., concurring) (quoting Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1868 (2005)).

5

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
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Holland is wrong on this point and it should be overruled. This
Court should hold that treaties cannot vest Congress with additional legislative power.
ARGUMENT

I. HOLLAND IS INCONSISTENT WITH CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

A. CONGRESS'S LEGISLATIVE POWER CAN BE INCREASED ONLY BY
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, NOT BY TREATY

Under Holland, some statutes are beyond Congress's power to
enact absent a treaty, but within Congress's power given a treaty.
This implication runs counter to the textual and structural logic of
the Constitution, because it means that Congress's powers are not
constitutionally fixed. 6 Under Holland, the legislative power is not
limited to the subjects enumerated in the Constitution; it can extend
to all of those subjects, plus any others that may be addressed by
treaty. And according to the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States:
[T]he Constitution does not require that an international
agreement deal only with "matters of international concern." The references in the Constitution presumably incorporate the concept of treaty and of other agreements in international law. International law knows no limitations on the
purpose or subject matter of international agreements, other
than that they may not conflict with a peremptory norm of
international law. States may enter into an agreement on
any matter of concern to them, and international law does not

6 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §4-4, at 645-46 (3d ed.
2000). ("By negotiating a treaty and obtaining the requisite consent of the Senate, the
President ... may endow Congress with a source of legislative authority independent of the powers enumerated in Article I.").
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look behind their motives or purposes in doing so. Thus,
the United States may make an agreement on any subject
suggested by its national interests in relations with other nations.7
If this is so, then Congress's legislative powers are not merely
somewhat expandable by treaty; they are expandable virtually without limit. The President could,· for example, enter into a treaty to
regulate guns near schools - and then Congress could re-enact Gun
Free School Zones Act, despite United States v. Lopez. 8 Indeed, that is
the tip of the iceberg. "The Commerce Clause is not a general license to regulate an individual from cradle to grave,"9 but under
Holland, a treaty could be just such a license. The President might,
ostensibly to foster better relations with another country, simply
exchange reciprocal promises to regulate the citizenry so as to maximize the collective welfare. If Holland means what it seems to say,
then such a treaty would confer upon Congress plenary legislative
power.
That proposition is, of course, flatly inconsistent with the basic
constitutional scheme of enumerated powers; it is in deep tension
with the Tenth Amendment's premise of reserved powers; and it
stands contradicted by countless canonical statements that Congress's powers are fixed and defined. It is axiomatic that "the Constitution[] confer[s] upon Congress ... not all governmental powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones." lo And, of course, "enumeration presupposes something not enumerated." 11 In Chief Justice Marshall's words: "[t]he powers of the legislature are defined,

7

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 302 cmt. c (1987).
s 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
9 Nat'! Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012).
10 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997).
11 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
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and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten,
the constitution is written."12
Indeed, in this very case, this Court explained: "By denying any
one government complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power." 13 This would be no protection at all if the legislative
power were readily expandable by treaty. All of these propositions,
from Marbury to Bond, are flatly inconsistent with Holland.

11

CONGRESS ONLY POSSESSES THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS HEREIN

B.

GRANTED."

The point is reinforced by the juxtaposition of the three Vesting
Clauses. Article II, Section 1, provides that [t]he executive Power
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America 14, and
Article III, Section 1, provides that [t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." 15 By contrast, Article I, Section 1, provides: All legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States." 16
There is a simple explanation for this difference in the Vesting
Clauses. Congress is the first mover in the mechanism of U.S. law. It
"make[s] ... Laws." 17 By contrast, the executive branch subsequently
execute[s]" the laws made by Congress, and the judicial branch
/1

/1

/1

11

Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176 (emphasis added).
United States v. Bond, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011).
14 U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1 (emphasis added).
1s U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 1 (emphasis added).
16 U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 1 (emphasis added).
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).

12
13
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interprets those laws. The scope of the executive and judicial power,
therefore, is contingent on acts of Congress.
For example, the Constitution provides that the President "shall
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 18 By passing a new
statute, Congress may expand the President's powers by giving him
a new law to execute. As Justice Jackson explained, "[w]hen the
President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate."19 In
other words, the scope of the executive power is not fixed; it is contingent on acts of Congress.
The judicial power is contingent in just the same way. Indeed, it
is expressly contingent, not only on statutes but also on treaties.
Article III provides that the judicial power shall "extend" to certain
sorts of cases and controversies. 20 The verb "to extend" suggests
today just what it signified in 1789: stretching, enlarging.21 And, in
particular, "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority."22 This clause expressly provides that the scope of the judicial
power may be expanded by treaty. A new (self-executing) treaty,
like a new statute, can give the judiciary something new to do, thus
expanding its jurisdiction. Thus, it would not have made sense to
limit the federal courts to the powers "herein granted," because the

U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 3.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) Qackson,
concurring) (emphasis added).
20 See U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. 1.
1s
19

21

See, e.g.,

SAMUEL JOHNSON,

A

DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

(W.

J.,

Stra-

han et al., 4th ed. 1773) ("To EXTEND ... 1. To stretch out towards any part.... 5. To
enlarge; to continue.... 6. To encrease in force or duration.... 7. To enlarge the comprehension of any position.... 9. To seize by a course of law." (emphases added)).
22 U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. 1 (emphases added).
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scope of the judicial power may be expanded, not only by statute
but also by treaty.
But, crucially, Article I has no such provision. The legislative
power does not "extend ... to Treaties made, or which shall be
made."23 Indeed, the legislative power does not "extend" at all. Rather, .the only legislative powers in the Constitution are those that
are enumerated, those that the document says are "herein granted."
The scope of the legislative power-unlike the scope of the executive and judicial powers-does not change with the passage of statutes or the ratification of treaties. The legislative power alone is
fixed rather than contingent, and so it alone is limited to an enumeration of powers "herein granted."
Indeed, this structural fact- reflected in the textual dichotomy
between the Vesting Clause of Article I and those of Articles II and
III-coheres perfectly with the underlying theory of separation of
powers. To create a tripartite government of limited powers, it is
logically necessary that at least one of the branches have fixed powers - powers that cannot be increased by the other branches. As one
would expect, that branch is Congress. Congress is the first branch
of government, the first mover in American law, the fixed star of
constitutional power.24 Congress can increase the President's power, but the President cannot increase Congress's power in return. If he
could, the federal government as a whole would cease to be one of
limited powers.
Moreover, to the extent that the jurisdiction of any branch may
be increased, it is naturally left to different political actors to work
the expansion. To entrust Congress to expand the jurisdiction of the

23

Id.

See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Savereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1443 n.71
(1987) ("Congress remained in many ways primus inter pares. Schematically, Article I
24

precedes Articles II and III. Structurally, Congress must exercise the legislative power before the executive and judicial powers have a statute on which to act.").
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executive and the judiciary is consistent with the theories of Montesquieu and Madison, because Congress has no incentive to overextend the powers of the other branches at its own expense.25
But it is quite another matter to entrust treaty-makers-the
President and Senate - to expand the power of lawmakers -the
President and Senate, plus the House. Here, there is no ambition to
counteract ambition; here, instead, ambition is handed the keys to
power. 26 As Henry St. George Tucker III wrote in his treatise on the
treaty power five years before Holland, "[s]uch interpretation would
clothe Congress with powers beyond the limits of the Constitution,
with no limitations except the uncontrolled greed or ambition of an
unlimited power."27

C. HOLLAND ENABLES THE CIRCUMVENTION OF ARTICLE V.

Another way to put the point is that Holland permits evasion of
Article V's constitutional amendment mechanism. As a general rule,

25 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *142 ("[W]here the legislative and
executive authority are in distinct hands, the former will take care not to entrust the
latter with so large a power, as may tend to the subversion of [its] own independence, and therewith of the liberty of the subject.").
26 See CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS
bk. XI, ch. IV, at 161 (photo. reprint 1991) G.V. Prichard ed., Thomas Nugent trans.,
G. Bell & Sons 1914) (1748) ("[E]very man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and
to carry his authority as far as it will go."); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947 (1983)
("[T]he profound conviction of the Framers that the powers conferred on Congress
were the powers to be most carefully circumscribed."); THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 306
Games Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous
vortex."); THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 313-14 Games Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("[T]he tendency of republican governments is to an aggrandizement of the
legislative at the expense of the other departments.").
Z1 HENRY ST. GEORGE TuCKER, LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWER § 113,
at 130 (1915).
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the legislative power can be increased only by constitutional
amendment. This expansion has happened several times.ZS
The process provided by the Constitution for its own amendment is of course far more elaborate than the process for making
treaties.29 But if Holland means what it seems to say, then treaties
"may endow Congress with a source of legislative authority independent of the powers enumerated in Article I."3o In other words,
the legislative power of Congress may be increased not just by constitutional amendment but also by treaty.
This Court rejected an analogous implication in City of Boerne v.
Flores:
If Congress could define its own powers by altering the
Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the
Constitution be "superior paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means." It would be "on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, ... alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it." Under this approach, it is
difficult to conceive of a principle that would limit congressional power. Shifting legislative majorities could change
the Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult
and detailed amendment process contained in Article V. 31

Holland achieves under the Necessary and Proper Clause exactly what City of Boerne rejected under Fourteenth Amendment. Read
literally, Holland renders the Necessary and Proper Clause expandable by the political branches with the ratification of each new treaty. It thus allows the President and Senate to work an expansion of

28 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; amend. XIV, § 5; amend. XV, § 2; amend. XIX,
cl. 2; amend. XXIII, § 2; amend. XXIV, § 2; amend. XXVI, § 2.
29 Compare U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2, with U.S. CONST. Art. V.
30 TRIBE, supra note 6.
31 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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legislative power -which "effectively circumvent[s] the difficult
and detailed amendment process contained in Article V." 32 This
cannot be right:
It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those

who created the Constitution, as well as those who were responsible for the Bill of Rights - let alone alien to our entire
constitutional history and tradition - to construe Article VI
as permitting the United States to exercise power under an
international agreement without observing constitutional
prohibitions. In effect, such construction would permit
amendment of that document in a manner not sanctioned
by Article V.33

IF HOLLAND WERE CORRECT, THENTHEPREsIDENT-ORA

D.

FOREIGN SoVEREIGN - COULD DECREASE CONGRESS'S POWER AND
RENDER U.S. STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL

If it is strange to think that the legislative power can be expanded, not only by constitutional amendment, but also by an action of
the President with the consent of the Senate, it is surely stranger still
to think that the legislative power may be contracted by the President alone. Yet this too is an implication of Holland.
As a general matter, "[i]f [a] statute is unconstitutional, it is unconstitutional from the start." 34And, conversely, if a statute is constitutional when enacted, it generally can be rendered unconstitutional only by a constitutional amendment. In other words, "[a]

Id.
Id. at 529 (citations omitted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (plurality opinion).
34 The Attorney General's Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55, 59 (1980).
32

33
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statute ... must be tested by powers possessed at the time of its enactment."35
Holland is inconsistent with that fundamental principle. Under
Holland, some exercises of legislative power derive their authority
not from the Constitution but from specific treaties.36 If so, then
when such treaties are terminated, their implementing statutes presumably become unconstitutional.3 7 Such statutes are suddenly rendered unconstitutional-not by constitutional amendment but by the
mere abrogation of a treaty. This is paradoxical. "The peculiar circumstances of the moment may render a measure more or less wise,
but cannot render it more or less constitutional."38
And if it is strange to think of a statute becoming unconstitutional, surely it is stranger still to think that the President may render a
statute unconstitutional unilaterally and at his sole discretion. Yet this
is what follows from Holland. The Executive Branch takes the position that the President has power to abrogate treaties unilaterally.39
If so, then the President, by renouncing a treaty, could unilaterally
render an implementing act of Congress unconstitutional.
This result is inconsistent with the basic proposition that "repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with [Article]
1."40 This Court did not hesitate to strike down a statute that "au-

Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 254 {1921)
See TRIBE, supra note 6 (treaties "may endow Congress with a source of legislative authority independent of the powers enumerated in Article I").
37 See LoUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 408 n.105 (1st ed.
1972) ("[I]n principle legislation to implement a treaty might cease to be valid if the
treaty lost its effect.").
38 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2579 (quoting Chief Justice John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, Alexandria Gazette, July 5, 1819, reprinted in John Marshall's Defense of
McCulloch v. Maryland 190-191 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969)).
39 See Validity of Congressional-Executive Agreements That Substantially Modify
the United States' Obligations Under an Existing Treaty, 20 Op. O.L.C. 389, 395 n.14
(1996).
40 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983).
35
36
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thorize[d] the President himself to effect the repeal of laws, for his
own policy reasons, without observing the procedures set out in
Article I, § 7." 41 The reason was simple: "[t]here is no provision in
the Constitution that authorizes the President ... to repeal statutes."42 Yet under Holland, legislation that reaches beyond enumerated powers to implement treaties is, in effect, subject to a different
rule. Here, in essence, the President has a unilateral power "to effect
the repeal of laws, for his own policy reasons." 43 Whenever he
chooses, he may abrogate a treaty and thus render any implementing legislation unconstitutional.
And that is not the worst of it. The President is not the only one
who can terminate a treaty. Our treaty partners can likewise renounce treaties. 44 Under Holland, therefore, it is not only the President who can, at his own discretion, render certain statutes unconstitutional by renouncing treaties. Foreign governments can do this too.
Surely the Framers would have been surprised to learn that a federal statute-duly passed by both Houses of Congress and signed by
the President-may, under some circumstances, be rendered unconstitutional at the discretion of, for example, the King of England.
After all, ending the King's capricious control over American legislation was the very first reason given on July 4, 1776, for the Revolution.45

41 Id. at 529 (citations omitted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803).
42 Id. at 438.
43 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 445.
44 See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 204
(2d ed. 1996) ("[A treaty] is not law of the land if it ... has been terminated or destroyed by breach (whether by the United States or by the other party or parties)." (emphasis added)).
45 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 2-4 (U.S. 1776).
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All these paradoxes can be resolved only if Congress's legislative power is, in fact, fixed by the Constitution and cannot be expanded by treaty.

E.

HOLLAND CREATES DOUBLY PERVERSE INCENTIVES-INCENTIVES
FOR MORE INTERNATIONAL ENTANGLEMENTS, WHICH IN TuRN
INCREASE DOMESTIC LEGISLATIVE POWER

The Framers were profoundly concerned about the tendency of
legislative power to expand. 46 The Framers were also deeply wary
of international entanglements. 47 If the Framers feared expanding
legislative power and feared international entanglements, then Holland would have been their worst nightmare. Under Holland, treatymakers - the President and Senate-are given a wish-for-morewishes power. They can increase their own legislative power (plus
that of the House). All they need is a willing head of state, anywhere on the globe, and a new entangling alliance.
This constitutes a powerfully perverse incentive for the President and Senate to enter into treaties that reach beyond enumerated

46 See The Federalist No. 48, supra note 26, at 306 ("The legislative department is
everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex."); The Federalist No. 49, supra note 26, at 313-14 ("[T]he tendency of
republican governments is to an aggrandizement of the legislative at the expense of
the other departments."); see also The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between
the President and Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 131 (1996) (Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General) ("Although the founders were concerned about the concentration of
governmental power in any of the three branches, their primary fears were directed
toward congressional self-aggrandizement."(citing Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 411 n.35 (1989))).
47 See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in WRITINGS
1136-39 (Merrill D. Peterson, ed. 1984) (calling for "peace, commerce, and honest
friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none"); GEORGE WASHINGTON
FAREWELL ADDRESS, S. Doc. No. 106-21, at 27 (2000) ("It is our policy to steer clear of
permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.").
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powers. After all, it is they themselves (plus the House of Representatives) who will be the beneficiaries of the increased domestic
legislative power. Indeed, the treaty-makers apparently succumbed
to just this temptation in Holland itself, as even its most ardent defenders concede: "If ever the federal government could be charged
with bad faith in making a treaty, this had to be the case." 48
The Constitution should not be construed to create this doubly
perverse incentive-an incentive to enter foreign entanglements
merely to attain the desired side effect of increased domestic legislative power. The Constitution should not be interpreted to encourage this sort of bad faith.

II. HOLLAND IS A DOCTRINAL ANOMALY

Holland is thus inconsistent with fundamental principles of constitutional structure. But it is also anomalous, even in relation to its
closest doctrinal cousins. To see the doctrinal anomaly, it is useful
to restate the general question. If a non-self-executing treaty promises that Congress will do something that it otherwise lacks power
to do, what happens? Can the President (with the consent of the
Senate), just by making such a promise, thus empower Congress to
do that thing, even if Congress lacked the power to do so the day
before? In short, can the treaty increase the legislative power of
Congress?
Now, it is undisputed that treaties are important. And it is undisputed that the United States should generally keep its promises.
Nevertheless - and notwithstanding the uncompromising language

48 David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MIGL L. REv. 1075, 1256 (2000).
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used in Holland"49_it is also undisputed that the answer to this question
is generally "no."
If, for example, the treaty promised that Petitioner would be
tried without presentment or indictment of a grand jury, the treaty
would not thereby empower Congress to authorize a violation of
the Fifth Amendment. Congress lacked that power before the treaty,
and the treaty cannot confer it.50
If the treaty promised that Petitioner would be tried by military
tribunal rather than by jury, the treaty would not thereby empower
Congress to authorize a violation of the Sixth Amendment. Congress lacked that power before the treaty, and the treaty cannot confer it.51
And this principle extends beyond the Bill of Rights. If the treaty promised a violation of Article III, Congress is not thereby empowered to authorize a violation of Article III. Congress lacked that
power before the treaty, and the treaty cannot confer it.52
Indeed this principle extends beyond express constitutional
prohibitions and includes constitutional structure as well. If the
treaty promised "a change in the character of the government, or in
that of one of the states, or a cession of any portion of the territory
of the latter, without its consent," Congress is not thereby empowered to accomplish such things. 53 Congress lacked that power before the treaty, and the treaty cannot confer it.
And if, despite Printz54 and New York v. United States55, a treaty
promised that Congress would commandeer state officials or state

Bond, 681 F.3d at 165.
Reid, 354 U.S. at 16-17.
51 See id.
52 See id. at 17-18.
49

50

53
54

De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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legislatures for its execution, then - even according to Holland's
preeminent defender - Congress would not thereby be empowered
to commandeer them.56 Congress lacked that power before the treaty, and the treaty cannot confer it.
This leaves only Holland - the one anomalous exception to an
eminently sensible rule. If a treaty promises that Congress will regulate something that is beyond its enumerated powers - guns near
schools,57 or violence against women,58 then, under Holland, Congress would automatically attain that new legislative power, even
though, under this Court's precedents, it lacks that power today.
This cannot be right. "[N]o agreement with a foreign nation can
confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government,
which is free from the restraints of the Constitution." 59 And as to this,
there is no basis for distinguishing enumerated powers and the
Tenth Amendment from the rest of the Constitution. "Federalism,"
no less than the Bill of Rights, "secures the freedom of the individual."60
Reid is right, and Holland is wrong. A treaty cannot empower
Congress to violate the Fifth Amendment, or violate the Sixth
Amendment, or undermine Article III, or commandeer state officials, or subvert constitutional structure. Likewise, a treaty cannot
empower Congress to exceed its enumerated powers and violate
the Tenth Amendment.61

ss 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
See HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 467 n.75
(2d ed. 1996) ("Presumably, the United States could not command state legislatures,
or 'coopt' state officials by treaty.").
57 See e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
58 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
59 Reid, 354 U.S. at 16 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
60 Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364.
61 See John C. Eastman, Will Mrs. Bond Topple Missouri v. Holland?, 2010-11 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 185, 194-202 (2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1941434.
56
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This Court realized this long before Holland, in a case that Justice Holmes failed to cite. As this Court explained in 1836: "The
government of the United States ... is one of limited powers. It can
exercise authority over no subjects, except those which have been
delegated to it. Congress cannot, by legislation, enlarge the federal
jurisdiction, nor can it be enlarged under the treaty-making power."62
Indeed, Justice Scalia made exactly the same point at oral argument
just last Term: "I don't think that powers that Congress does not
have under the Constitution can be acquired by simply obtaining
the agreement of the Senate, the President and Zimbabwe. I do not
think a treaty can expand the powers of the Federal Govemment."63
At that time, less than a year ago, the Solicitor General was in
"complete[] agreement."64

III. THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE DOES NOT EXPAND WITH
EACH NEW TREATY

As this Court explained when it first encountered this case, the
"ultimate issue" here turns on the conjunction of the Necessary and
Proper Clause and the Treaty Clause. 65 The question is whether
these two Clauses in conjunction somehow require all the anomalous results detailed above. To answer that question, it is essential
to examine the text of the two clauses and determine how they fit
together. Article I provides:

62

New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 736 (1836) (emphasis add-

ed).
63 Transcript of Oral Argument at 32-33, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012)
(No. 10-545).
64 Id. at 33.
65 Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2367 (2011).
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The Congress shall have Power ... To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof.66
The Treaty Clause provides:
[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur.67
By echoing the word "Power," the Treaty Clause leaves no
doubt: the treaty power is an "other Power[]" referred to in the
Necessary and Proper Clause.
That much is implicit in Holland, although Justice Holmes did
not quote either clause, let alone discuss how they fit together. But
the conjunction of the two clauses is essential to analyzing whether
a treaty may increase congressional power. Here, then, is the way
that these two clauses fit together as a matter of grammar:
The Congress shall have Power ... To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
... [the President's] Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties.68
When the two clauses are properly conjoined, it becomes clear
that the key term is the infinitive verb "to make." The power ,granted to Congress is emphatically not the power to make laws for car-

U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2
U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2.
68 U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, art. II,§ 2.

66
67
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rying into execution "all treaties." Rather, what may be carried into
execution is the "Power ... to make Treaties."
This power would certainly extend to laws appropriating money for the negotiation of treaties. As Rep. James Hillhouse explained
in 1796, "the President has the power of sending Ambassadors or
Ministers to foreign nations to negotiate Treaties ... [but] it is ...
clear that if no money is appropriated for that purpose, he cannot
exercise the power."69
But on the plain text of the conjoined clauses, the object of this
necessary and proper legislation is limited to the "Power ... to make
Treaties" in the first place. This is not the power to implement treaties already made.
Nor will it do to say that the phrase "make Treaties" is a term of
art meaning "conclude treaties with foreign nations and then give
them domestic legal effect." There is no indication that the phi:ase
"make Treaties" ever had such a meaning. British treaties at the
time of the Framing were non-self-executing, requiring an act of
Parliament to create enforceable domestic law,7° and yet Blackstone
wrote simply of "the king's prerogative to make treaties," without
any suggestion that Parliament had a role in the "mak[ing].".71
Blackstone understood the difference between making a treaty,
which the King could do, and giving it domestic legal effect, which
required an act of Parliament. The "Power ... to make Treaties''. is
exhausted once a treaty is ratified; implementation is something
else altogether.
This Court saw that textual point clearly when construing a
statute with similar language, to wit, the "right ... to make ... con-

5 Annals of Cong. 673-74 (1796).
See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 274 (1796),
n BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *249 (emphases added); see also id. at *243 ("[T]he
king ... may make what treaties ... he pleases." (emphasis added)); id. at *244 ("[T]he
king may make a treaty." (emphasis added)).
69

70
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tracts."72 This statutory "right ... to make ... contracts" is textually
and conceptually parallel to the constitutional "Power ... to make
Treaties" both because they share the key infinitive verb "to make"
and because, as Chief Justice Marshall explained, a non-selfexecuting treaty (like the one at issue in this case) is itself in the nature of a contract.73 This Court explained:
[T]he right to make contracts does not extend, as a matter of
either logic or semantics, to conduct ... after the contract relation has been established, including breach of the terms of
the contract .... Such postformation conduct does not involve the right to make a contract, but rather implicates the
performance of established contract obligations ... 74
This is exactly right- and it is flatly inconsistent with Holland. The
"Power ... to make Treaties" does not extend, as a matter of logic or
semantics, to the implementation of treaties already made.
The title of the present statute suffices to finish the point. "The
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998" implements a treaty; it is neither necessary nor proper to make any treaty.
.

IV. THE MOST INFLUENTIAL ARGUMENT SUPPORTING HOLLAND IS
BASED ON A MISREADING OF CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

Justice Holmes set forth no arguments whatsoever for the
proposition that treaties can increase Congress's legislative power.

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006)).
See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) ("[W]hen the terms of the
stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and
the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the court.").
74 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491U.S.164, 177 (1989) (emphases added).
72
73
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And subsequent scholars and courts have generally contented
themselves with a citation to Holland. But one eminent scholar has
presented a single substantive argument in support of this proposition, based upon the drafting history of the Constitution.
As discussed above, the legislative power, unlike the judicial
power, does not expressly "extend to ... Treaties made, or which
shall be made" 75; indeed, the legislative power does not "extend" at
all. Rather, the legislative power is limited by the Constitution to
those powers that it enumerates- those that are "herein granted."76And the Necessary and Proper Clause-even when conjoined
with the "Power . . . to make treaties" - says nothing whatsoever
about enforcing treaties already made. 77
To these textual points, though, Professor Louis Henkin has an
apparently devastating reply based on constitutional drafting history: "The 'necessary and proper' clause originally contained expressly the
power 'to enforce treaties' but it was stricken as superfluous. "78 This is
the most powerful form of argument from constitutional history,
because it is so specific and unambiguous. On this drafting history,
it would certainly appear that the Necessary and Proper Clause - in
its final form, without those crucial words - still subsumes the
power "to enforce treaties" beyond the other enumerated powers.
This argument from drafting history would appear to be a complete
answer to the textual arguments above; indeed it would appear to
obviate the need for textual analysis altogether.

U.S. CoNsr. art. III,§ 2, cl. 1
U.S. CoNsr. art. I,§ 1. See supra Part 1-B.
77 See supra Part III.
78 HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 1HE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 481 n.111 (2d
ed. 1996) (emphasis added).
75

76
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And so, unsurprisingly, this argument has proven quite influential. 79 Indeed, when this Court invoked Holland nine years ago, it
cited Henkin's treatise. 80 Likewise, in this very case, the Government relied on this argument to oppose a motion to dismiss certain
counts of the indictment- quoting this exact drafting history as set
forth by Professor Henkin. Neither Lara nor the Government's brief
opposing the motion to dismiss carefully parsed or conjoined the
text of the Treaty Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause,s1
but this is perfectly understandable. (Indeed, the phrase "necessary
and proper" and the phrase "to make treaties" never appear in the
same sentence in the United States Reports.) After all, any such
analysis of the actual constitutional text was obviated by Henkin' s
ostensibly dispositive drafting history.
But Professor Henkin was wrong. As recent scholarship has
demonstrated, he simply misread the constitutional history. The
words "to enforce treaties" never appeared in any draft of the Necessary
and Proper Clause. They were never struck as superfluous from that
Clause, because they never appeared in that Clause at all. The
phrase "enforce treaties" was struck from the Militia Clause, which
was apparently the source of Henkin' s confusion. s2 But that drafting
history provides no support for Holland.B3
In short, the leading treatise on the law of foreign affairs makes
exactly one argument in support of Holland's unreasoned assump-

79 It appeared in the first edition of Henkin's treatise, see Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 408 n.105 (1st ed. 1972), and again, a generation
later, in the second edition, see LoUJS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 480 n.108, 481 n.111 (2d ed. 1996).
so United States v. Lara, 541U.S.193, 201 (2004).
s1 See supra Part III.
82 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 323, 382 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1937).
83 See Rosenkranz, supra note 4, at 1912-18.
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tion that treaties can increase the legislative power of Congress.
This treatise has profoundly influenced debate on this question, and
its argument from constitutional drafting history has, for decades,
short-circuited any careful analysis of the actual constitutional text.
But, as it turns out, the argument in the treatise is based on a historical premise that is simply, demonstrably false.

V. HOLLAND SHOULD NOT BE SUSTAINED ON STARE DECISIS
GROUNDS

At first glance, Holland might appear to present the strongest
possible case for application of stare decisis. It is 93 years old. It was
written by Justice Holmes. And it is canonical.
But the argument for stare decisis is not nearly as compelling as
it may first appear. The opinion may be canonical, but on the point
at issue-Congress's power to legislate pursuant to treaty- it is also
utterly unreasoned. The stare decisis force of an opinion turns, in
large part, on the quality of its reasoning and diminishes substantially if it provides no reasoning at all.84
Moreover, while Holland is 93 years old, its holding concerning
legislative power pursuant to treaty has been all but irrelevant for
most of that time. Again, Holland's key sentence on this point is this
one: "If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity
of the [implementing] statute under Article I, Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Govemment."85
But in 93 years, this Court has never once quoted any part of that

B4 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) ("(W]hen governing decisions
are ... badly reasoned, 'this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent."'
(quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944))).
as Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
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sentence. It can hardly be contended that there has been much reliance upon it.
The reason is clear. From 1937 to 1995, this Court did not strike
down a single statute as beyond Congress's enumerated powers.
Throughout the decades when the Commerce Clause power was
construed to be essentially plenary, the question of expanding Congress's legislative power by treaty was almost entirely hypothetical.
During those years, any legislation that Congress enacted to execute
a treaty could almost certainly have also been sustained under the
Co~erce ClauseB6 or some other enumerated power.87 Only after
Lopez,88 did Holland's secondary holding, on the scope of treatyrelated legislative power, recover potential practical significance.
Thus, any supposed reliance of the political branches on this holding must be dated from 1995, not 1920.
Even since 1995, this Court has struck down only three statutes
as beyond the enumerated powers of Congress. 89 It can hardly be
said, therefore, that the conduct of foreign affairs has been undertaken in substantial reliance on the rule that federal legislative power may be increased by treaty.

86 Earlier in this litigation, the government foreswore any reliance on the Commerce Clause. JA31 ("Section 229 was not enacted under the interstate commerce
authority."). It seems inappropriate to allow the government to resuscitate the
Commerce Clause argument at this late date. But even if the government is to be
allowed to reverse course as to this argument (and confess error for the second time
in this case), the proper place for it would be on remand. This Court should decide
the treaty question addressed by the opinion below.
87 See Tribe, supra note 6, § 4-4, at 646 ("The importance of treaties as independent
sources of congressional power has waned substantially in the years since ... Holland
... [;] the Supreme Court (in the intervening period has] so broadened the scope of
Congress' constitutionally enumerated powers as to provide ample basis for most
imaginable legislative enactments quite apart from the treaty power.").
ss 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
89 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (invalidating part of the Violence Against Women
Act); Flores, 521 U.S. at 536 (invalidating part of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68 (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
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Scholars only now are discovering Holland's potential for evading this Court's stated limits on congressional power.9o If the political branches should move to act on the proposals of these scholars,
that would constitute unfortunate reliance on erroneous doctrine.
But right now-while these proposals are in the law reviews and
not in Treaties in Force or Statutes at Large - Holland may be overruled on this point without any dislocation of foreign relations or
domestic law.
This Court has not hesitated to reconsider a canonical opinion
when new scholarship in the HARVARD LAW REVIEW demonstrates
that the conventional historical account was simply wrong.91 And
this Court has not hesitated to overrule such an opinion when it
becomes clear that the opinion is fundamentally inconsistent with
constitutional structure. 92 This is just such a case.
In short, Holland may be canonical, but it d0es not present a
strong case for stare decisis. It was wrongly decided on this point,
and it should be overruled.

See Rosenkranz, supra note 4, at 1871-73 & nn.19-25 (collecting articles).
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72-73 n.5 (1938) (citing Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49,
90
91

51-52, 81-88, 108 (1923)).
92 Erie, 304 U.S. at 77 (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)).
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CONCLUSION

A treaty cannot confer new legislative power on Congress, and
so the treaty at issue here did not empower Congress to enact
18 U.S.C. § 229.93 The Third Circuit's judgment should be reversed.

93 Jt is a quirk of the pleadings that Petitioner purports to challenge the statute
"as-applied." That characterization may be inapt, because the gravamen of the claim
concerns the scope of congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause,
which would seem to be "facial" by nature. In any case, and regardless of the vexed
"facial"/ "as-applied" dichotomy, the important point is that her challenge is necessarily a challenge to legislative action. This Court should hold that Congress exceeded
its power (and thus violated the Tenth Amendment), by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 229. See
Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2368 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("[A] law beyond the power of
Congress ... is no law at all. The validity of Bond's conviction depends upon whether
the Constitution permits Congress to enact § 229."); see generally Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209 (2010).

